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Moderamen inculpatae tutelae: The Jurisprudence of a
Justifiable Defense
Ken Pennington
Intentionality and proportionality enter the jurisprudence dealing
with rights of defense at the end of the third century of the
common era. A rescript of the emperors Diocletian and Maximian
to a certain Theodorus in 290 A.D. resolved a legal issue that had
arisen from a court case. The question sent to the imperial court
must have been: what kind of a defense a person can use if a
robber attempts to take his property away. The imperial court’s
response coined a new term, “moderamen inculpatae tutelae” that
had never been used before, at least not in the sources that are still
preserved: 1
A person lawfully in possession has the right (recte) to use a
controlled amount of blameless force (moderamen inculpatae
tutelae) to repel any violence exerted for the purpose of depriving
him of possession, if he holds it under a title that is not defective.
Three centuries later the rescript was included in the Emperor
Justinian’s codification of Roman law. We have some if not
complete certainty that the term was used for the first time because
Roman law jurisprudence prior to 290 does not contain the term,
rule, or concept. “Inculpata” occurs twice in Justinian’s Digest and
describes only the characteristics a witness in a trial ought to have
and what constitutes a blameless delay. 2 Two other passages in the
Digest treat the issue of defense of property but not a legitimate
self-defense. 3 These texts also do not insert the concept of a
1

Justinian’s Codex 8.4.1, under the title “Unde vi, recte possidenti:” “Recte
possidenti ad defendendam possessionem quam sine vitio tenebat, inculpatae
tutelae moderatione illatam vim propulsare licet.”
2
Justinian’s Digest 22.5.3: “. . . honestae et inculpatae vitae . . .”
3
Ibid. 9.2.45 and 43.16.3.9.

2

proportional or measured defense into the discussion of norms that
might bind a person who defended himself.
Diocletian’s and Maximian’s rescript did not lay down
rules for personal self-defense. Three points were made about
defense of property: a person has the right to defend property in
his possession; the force used for its defense must be measured; the
person must hold a just title to the property or any defense is not
legitimate.
The word “moderamen” is either mysterious or
instructive. It meant either control of someone over something, or
the rudder of a ship, or guidance of affairs or government. It
occurs twice in the Digest. Once in the constitution Tanta with
which Justinian confirmed the publication of the Digest, and in the
title dealing with formal pronouncements. 4 In each place the word
is used rather vaguely and generically and without a specific
juridical meaning. It would be left to the jurists of the medieval
and early modern eras to define what the words of the phrase
meant.
Self-defense was embedded in classical Roman law. The
Roman jurist Gaius in the second century asserted that natural
reason permits a person to defend himself. 5 A bit later Paul
declared that “all laws and all rights (legal systems) permit persons
to repel force with force.” 6 Justinian’s jurists put together a
summary of what must have been a much larger discussion among
their classical forbearers at the beginning of the Digest: 7
<Ulpian> The Ius gentium is what all human beings observe. It is
easy to understand how it is different from natural law because
natural law applies to all animals but the Ius gentium governs only
human beings. Pomponius: <e.g.> such as piety towards God,

4

Ibid. “Constitutio Tanta,” and 2.12.7.
Dig. 9.2.4: “nam adversus periculum naturalis ratio permittit se defendere.”
6
Dig. 9.2.45: “vim enim vi defendere omnes leges omniaque iura permittunt.”
7
Dig. 1.1.1.4; 1.1.2; 1.1.3: “Ius gentium est, quo gentes humanae utuntut. Quod
a naturali <iure> recedere facile intellegere licet, quia illud omnibus animalibus,
hoc solis hominibus inter se commune sit. <2>Pomponius . . . Ueluti erga deum
religio, ut parentibus et patriae pareamus. <3>Florentinus . . . ut vim atque
iniuriam propulsemus.”
5

3

obedience to parents and loyalty to the country. Florentinus: or the
right to resist violence and injury.
Although these jurists were quite willing to concede that selfdefense was a basic right, they were not inclined to call it a natural
right based on natural law. That step was taken in the twilight of
the ancient world by Isidore of Seville who connected the right of
self- defense for the first time to natural law in his Etymologies: 8
What is natural ius? Ius is either natural or civil or the peoples.
Natural ius is common to all peoples. It has its origins in the
instinct of nature, not in any constitution as in the union of men
and women, the procreation and raising of children, the common
possessions of all persons, the equal liberty of all persons, the
acquisition of things that are taken from the heavens, earth, or sea,
or the return of property or money that has been deposited or
entrusted. This also includes the right to repel violence with
force. These and similar things are never unjust but are natural and
equitable.
Isidore’s text had lain dormant until the first half of the twelfth
century when Gratian included it and many other definitions of law
from the Etymologies. 9 The jurist quickly focused on these texts in
the standard libri legales when they discussed the right of self8

Isidori hispalensis episcopi Etymologiarum sive originum libri XX, ed. W.M.
Lindsay (2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1911) 5.4: “Quid sit ius
naturale? Ius aut naturale est aut ciuile aut gentium. Ius naturale commune
omnium nationum, eo quod ubique instinctu naturae, non constitutione aliqua
habetur, ut viri et feminę coniunctio, liberorum successio et educatio,communis
omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, acquisitio eorum, quae cęlo, terra
marique capiuntur; item depositę rei vel commendatę pecuniae restitutio,
violentię per vim repulsio. Nam hoc, aut si quid huic simile est, nunquam
injustum, sed naturale aequumque habetur.” Text here is based on St. Gall,
Stiftsbibliothek 231, fol. 151b.
9
I have discussed Gratian’s text and its importance in “Lex naturalis and Ius
naturale,” The Jurist 68 (2008) 569-591and in a slightly revised version in
Error! Main Document Only.Crossing Boundaries at Medieval Universities,
ed. Spencer E. Young (Education and Society in the Middle Ages and
Renaissance, 36. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011) 227-253.

4

defense. Stephan Kuttner first recognized the importance of the
canonists for formulating a jurisprudence of intentionality for
regulating the right of self-defense. As was typical of scholarship
at the time, Kuttner focused exclusively on the canonists and did
not give the teachers of Roman law their due. 10 He showed that
the canonists accepted Isidore’s claim that the right was
established in natural law, which for them was the equivalent of
divine law. 11 It could also be considered a principle of the Ius
gentium, but Ius naturale trumped Ius gentium if the two came into
conflict in the hierarchy of laws.
Stephen of Tournai (ca. 1165) may have been the first
canonist to connect the Roman law concept of a measured defense
with a person’s right of self-defense. He argued that a defense
could not be without limits. The intentions and judgment of the
victim were limited in the face of the attacker’s criminal act.
Stephen also thought that self-defense must be understood as an
immediate response to an attack. Any time between the original
attack and a response was no longer self-defense. 12
10

Stephan Kuttner, Error! Main Document Only.Kanonistische Schuldlehre
von Gratian bis auf die Dekretalen Gregors IX: Systematisch auf Grund der
handschriftlichen Quellen dargestellt (Studi e Testi 64. Città del Vaticano:
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1935) 334-379. See the brief treatment of
Thierry Kouamé, “Légitime défense du corps et légitime défense des biens chez
les Glossateurs (XIIe-XIIIe siècle),” Violences souveraines au Moyen Âge.
Travaux d’une école historique, ed. François Foronda, C. Barralis and B. Sère
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2010) 19-27. Error! Main Document
Only.Lawrence G. Duggan, Armsbearing and the Clergy in the History and
Canon Law of Western Christianity (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2013) has touched
upon the right of self-defense.
11
Rudolf Error! Main Document Only.Weigand, Die Naturrechtslehre der
Legisten und Dekretisten von Irnerius bis Accursius und von Gratian bis
Johannes Teutonicus (Münchener theologische Studien, 3, Kanonistische
Abteilung, 26; München: Max Hueber Verlag, 1967) 141: Paucapalea, who
also knew the Roman law texts, D.1 c.7 s.v. violentiae per vim repulsio: “Hec
omnia predicta ad ius naturale expectant.” Kuttner gives several examples of
the canonists attributing self-defense to ius naturale; Kuttner, Error! Main
Document Only.Kanonistische Schuldlehre 336-339.
12
Error! Main Document Only.Stephen of Tournai, Die Summa über das
Decretum Gratiani, ed. Johann Friedrich von Schulte (Giessen: Emil Roth,
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Stephen’s application of the Roman norm for the defense of
property to personal self-defense was not a foregone conclusion.
The ancient Roman jurists had never linked the two. One could
make a respectable argument that defending the human person
should not have limits; especially if one were to ignore the
humanity of the attacker and focus only on his culpability.
Further, the defense of property could be considered to be in a
different category. Later canonists followed Stephen. They added
one important norm. If a defense was not carried out immediately,
then it was no long self-defense but revenge. Johannes Teutonicus
(ca. 1215) added yet another wrinkle, if a person defended himself
too aggressively, but unintentionally, he was not culpable. 13
Intention began taking center stage in juristic thought.
Martinus, one of the four “doctors” of Roman law, was
reluctant to accept Gratian’s argument that self-defense rest on Ius
naturale. He commented in a gloss to Justinian’s Institutes that the
“statute of reason” established by nature in the Ius gentium
permitted the legitimate (iure fecisse dicitur) defense of a person’s
own body. 14 Other Roman law jurists were not so hesitant. Henry

1891) 10 to D.1 c.7 s.v. violentiae: Videtur contrarium dici, ff. de iustitia et
iure l. Ut inde, ibi namque dicitur, quod vim atque iniuriam propulsare de iure
gentium est; hic dicit, esse de iure naturali. Sed ibi dicit, vim cum iniuria, quam
soli homines et non bruta animalia et pati possunt et facere; quod potius ad ius
gentium quam ad naturale spectat Vel hic intelligamus ius naturale, quod solis
hominibus insitum est a natura, seposito eo, quod brutis
animalibus inest. Violentiae autem repulsionem hic dicit, si fiat in continenti,
maleficio adhuc flagrante. Vim enim vi repellere omnes leges et omnia iura
permittunt cum moderatione tamen inculpatae tutelae.
13
Kuttner, Error! Main Document Only.Kanonistische Schuldlehre 340 n.2;
In the early thirteenth century Johannes Teutonicus commented on C.23 q.1
d.a.c.1, Admont, Stiftsbibliothek 35, fol. 306ra, s.v. iniuriam propulsandam:
Requiritur ergo quod defendendo repercutiat non ulciscendo . . . et ut cum
moderamine se defendat, ut extra iii. de resititut. Cum causam, in fine . . . si
quis tamen moderamen excedit et non ex proposito, non tenetur, ut ff. ad leg.
Aquil. Si ex plagis § Tabernarius, licet illa decretalis Cum causam videatur
contradicere.”
14
Weigand, Naturrechtslehre 32: “Item ius gentium cum sit constitutio rationis
a natura in anima insite ars dicitur boni et equi, set cum quandam distinctione.

6

of Bailia (ca. 1170) 15 copied a long commentary by the canonist
Rufinus (ca. 1160) who had a few years earlier broached the
question of whether Isidore and Gratian or the Roman jurists got it
right: 16
In the first title of the Digest it is held that to resist force and injury is
established by the Ius gentium. If it were established by the Ius
gentium and not by Ius naturale, then the Ius gentium would be
different from the Ius naturale. However, those who are learned in
Roman law say it is one thing to repel just force and another to fight
because of injury. The first, they say, is established by Ius naturale
because nature teaches all animals to respond to force; brutish animals
resist force. The second indeed is established by the Ius gentium and
applies only to human beings, because only humans are said to suffer
injury and to inflict injury.

Hec enim constitutio, scilicet quod quisque ob tutelam sui corporis fecerit, iure
fecisse dicitur.”
15
Ibid. 47. Weigand discusses the question of whether Rufinus copied Henry or
Henry Rufinus. On Henry see Cecilia Natalini, “Enrico di Bailia,” Dizionario
dei giuristi italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese,
Antonello Mattone, Marco Nicola Miletti (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013)
1.798-799.
16
Error! Main Document Only.Rufinus of Bologna, Summa Decretorum, ed.
Heinrich Singer (Paderborn: 1902; reprinted Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1963) 9-10,
D.1 c.7 s.v. terra marique capiuntur: “In primo namque titulo Digestorum
habetur quod vim atque iniuriam propellere de iure gentium est: si de iure
gentium, non igitur de iure naturali, cum aliud sit ius gentium, aliud ius naturale.
Sed, ut aiunt ipsi legis periti, aliud est repellere vim tantum, aliud iniuriam etiam
propulsare: primum, inquiunt, est de iure naturali, quia id natura omnia animalia
docuit — bruta etenim animalia propulsant vim —; secundum vero est de iure
gentium — soli namque homines, et non animalia, iniuriam pati dicuntur et
facere. Nos autem credimus quod hic agitur etiam de repulsione violentie cum
propulsatione iniurie. Et ammonitum est supra aliter legum latores et aliter nos
accipere ius naturale: et ipsi quidem simplicius et generalius, ut communiter
ascribatur illud omnibus animalibus; nos autem specialius, ut attribuamus
solummodo hominibus. Ideoque ipsi cum talem propulsationem violentie sciant
brutis animalibus non esse communem, non dicunt eam esse de iure naturali, sed
gentium. Item quod dicitur “quia equum est repellere violentiam per vim,” satis
consonat legibus, ubi traditur quia vi vim repellere. omnes leges omniaque iura
permittunt.” On Rufinus see Antonia Fiori, “Rufino,” Dizionario dei giuristi
italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone,
Marco Nicola Miletti (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 2.1756-1757.

7

We believe that here [i.e. Isidore’s text] it concerns the
resistance of violence and of injury. As is mentioned above, the
teachers of Roman law understand Ius naturale differently from us.
They understand the term simply and broadly — as they commonly
ascribe Ius naturale to all animals— we understand it as being
especially granted to all human beings.
These jurists know that
humans have nothing in common with brutish animals that have this
propensity for violence. They do not think that this propensity is from
Ius naturale but from Ius gentium. Consequently, when it is said that it
is equitable to resist violence with force, it is congruent with Roman
law, where it is stated that all laws and all iura permit force to be
repelled with force.

The Roman law jurists, however, did begin to discuss the limits of
resistance dictated by the phrase “moderamen inculpatae tutelae”
when a person defended his property.
Guglielmo da Cabriano who was a student of Bulgarus, one
of the first teachers of Roman law in Bologna — wrote a treatise
on the Codex ca. 1150. 17 He was an early jurist to discuss the
meaning of the phrase: 18
No one is permitted to take possession through force. It is permitted to
all persons to protect possessions with force. However, it must be done
with “moderatio inculpatae tutelae.” If he uses arms against you as he
takes possession, you can use arms to retain possession. But if you can
otherwise protect yourself, yet you choose to kill, without a doubt you
are culpable . . . If, when you can repel force without homicide, you
have chosen, as I have said, to kill, then you have not repelled force but
you have created force.
17

Tammo Wallinga, “Guglielmo da Cabriano,” Dizionario dei giuristi italiani
(XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone, Marco
Nicola Miletti (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.1087-1088.
18
Error! Main Document Only.Wilhelmus de Cabriano. The Casus Codicis of
Wilhelmus de Cabriano, ed. Tammo Wallinga (Studien zur europäischen
Rechtsgeschichte, 182. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005) 555:
“Possessionem per vim adipisci nemini licet; tueri autem eam etiam per vim
omnibus licet, ita tamen ut cum moderatione inculpate tutele fiat, videlicet ut si
ille armis utatur adversus te in possessione auferenda, tu adversus eum utaris in
ea retinenda. Se si cum potuisti alias te tueri occidere maluisti, procul dubio
culpandus eris . . . set si cum possis repellere vim sine homicidio maluisti ut
dixi occidere, tunc non vim repellere videris, set potius facere.”

8

Guglielmo infers that if a person who wishes to take your property
is not armed you may not use arms to defend your property. In a
neat bit of analysis, he also observes that if you do use arms
against an unarmed person, from the point of view of the law you
become the aggressor and, legally, are culpable of the crime of
aggression as well as any injury that you inflicted on your attacker.
Placentinus († ca. 1181-1182) probably studied at Bologna
with Bulgarus and later taught in various Italian cities and
Montpellier. 19 He was the first jurist to write an extensive Summa
on Justinian’s Codex. 20 He probably finished it in Montpellier in
the early 1160’s. His commentary on the title “Unde vi” was
extensively and mainly concerned with procedural remedies
(interdicta) for property that had be taken away illegally with
force. These remedies were given to people who had lost their
property to armed men because they had been terrorized. 21 He
broached the question of time: 22
It is permitted to repel violence, as it is stated, immediately. It is
permitted to the person who possesses the property to claim it after
19

The facts of Placentinus’ life are not certain; see Ennio Cortese, “Piacentino,”
Dizionario dei giuristi italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio
Cortese, Antonello Mattone, Marco Nicola Miletti (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino,
2013)
2.1568-1571 and Hermann Lange, Error! Main Document
Only.Römisches Recht im Mittelalter, 1: Die Glossatoren (München: C.H.
Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1997) 207-214.
20
He completed Rogerius’ incomplete Summa.
21
Placentinus, Summa in Codice (Mainz: 1536; reprinted Torino: Bottega
d’Erasmo, 1962) 174: “Item datur in homines armatos, quorum metu quis
perterritus de possessione fugerit, sive ille possessionem occupaverit sive alii
sive nulli. Haec inquam ita sive re armati veniebant aut si veniebant non ut
deiicerent, veniebant interdicto unde vi non tenebuntur nisi possessionem
occupaverint.”
22
Ibid. “Vim ei repellere, sicut dictum est, incontinenti licet, nam ex intervallo
possidenti licet, sed cum moderatione inculpatae tutelae. Vt si sine armis possit
expellere, arma non debeat adhibere, non debeat vulnerare. Non assumpto alio
negotio, id est, non reservet nec differat post dies, set instet amicos, vicinos,
consanguineos, rogitet, anxie desudet ut congregato cetu eum qui se expulit
expellat, et sic repulisse videbitur, ut ff. eodem de de adulteriis l. Quod ait [Dig.
48.5.24(23)]. Permissum enim est unicuique iniuriam repellere non vindicare.”

9

a time, but only with “moderatio inculpatae tutelae.” If it is
possible to expel the attacker without arms, they should not be
used, and the possessor should not wound his assailant.
<The
rule is this>. Do not engage in other activity, that is do not
postpone or defer to another day. Urge friends, neighbors,
relatives; ask and exhort them that they come together and drive
out and expel him who has driven out the possessor. It is permitted
to everyone to repel an injury but not for revenge.
Placentinus connected violence and possession to a society in
which a person had a number of bonds. Arms should never be
used when they could be avoided. If one wished to repel violence
lawfully, it must be done without delay. One could enlist the aid
of others, but action must be taken with a minimum of delay.
Force can be resisted with force, but intention is crucial. Force
exercised with the intention of revenge is never legitimate.
The canonists loved distinctions, and the concept of a
justifiable defense (moderamen inculpatae tutelae) gave them
many opportunities to demonstrate their cleverness.
An
anonymous jurist argued that if someone wanted to take my horse
away from me, and I killed the robber, I would be culpable. 23
Huguccio, the most creative canonist of the twelfth century, wrote
an exhaustive commentary on the right of self-defense in his great
Summa, which was the most detailed and extensive ever written on
Gratian’s Decretum. Huguccio was a master of the distinction, and
he applied his skill to the weapons that could be used in a
defense. 24 He began by noting that self-defense is governed by
23

Kuttner, Error! Main Document Only.Kanonistische Schuldlehre p. 341 n.3:
“si enim aliquis alicui voluit aufferre equum et equum tuendo illum occidit,
culpata est hec tutela.”
24
Error! Main Document Only.Huguccio, Summa, ed. Přerovský to D.1 c.7,
s.v. violentie, p. 40-45 at 40: “Est etiam de hoc iudicio rationis huic consonat
quod in lege dicitur vim vi repellere omnes leges et omnia iura permittunt, ut ff.
de vi et de vi arm. l.i. [Dig. 43.16.1.27].” This passage is a piece of evidence for
my remarks about the edition in n.20. Přerovský’s edition reads: “Est etiam hoc
de iudicio rationis. Hic consonat quod in lege dicitur vim vi repellere omnes
leges et omnia iura permittunt, ut ff. de vi et de vi ar. l.i.” Not reading “huic”

10

reason which brings it into congruence with the famous dictum in
Justinian’s Digest that all law and all concepts of rights recognize
the right to repel force with force. 25 Reason, emphasized
Huguccio, was crucial in determining the legitimacy of a person’s
right of self-defense. For every jurist his emphasis on reason
would call to mind all the texts in the Digest that defined the
“reasonable person” (homo diligens). After first dealing with the
issue of clerics, he laid down three primary rules for self-defense:
“It should be for one’s own defense, the right must be exercised
immediately and without delay, and the norms of ‘moderamen
inculpatae tutelae’ must be adhered to.” 26 Huguccio defined
personal self-defense as “that which is not done with hate or with
the heat of revenge.” “It must be understood,” he added, “this
applies to a situation in which you have no other choice but to
defend yourself. If a person may evade the attack, it is not

for “hic” in the best manuscripts, e.g. Munich, Staatsbibliothek 10247, fol. 2vb
and Lons-leSaunier, Archives departementales du Jura 16, fol. 4rb.
25
Wolfgang Peter Müller, Error! Main Document Only.Huguccio: The Life,
Works, and Thought of a Twelfth-Century Jurist (Studies in Medieval and Early
Modern Canon Law, 3; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America
Press, 1994) and his up-dated summary with a couple of new pieces of evidence
in “Summa Decretorum of Huguccio,” The History of Canon Law in the
Classical Period, 1140-1234, edd. Wilfried Hartmann and Ken Pennington
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2008) 142-160. The first twenty
distinctions of Huguccio’s Summa have been edited., Huguccio Pisanus, Summa
decretorum, 1: Distinctiones I-XX, ed. Oldřich Přerovský (Monumenta iuris
canonici, Series A, 6. Città del Vaticano: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 2006).
Unfortunately, the edition has too many errors, beginning on the title page.
Müller proved that Huguccio should not be given the cognomen “Pisanus.”
26
Huguccio, ed. Přerovský to D.1 c.7, s.v. violentie, p. 41: “Set intelligendum .
. . ut enim de iure fiat repulsio iniurie vel violentie, tria exiguntur, scilicet ut fiat
ad tuitionem sui et incontinenti et servato moderamine inculpatae tutele.”
Přerovský citation to Dig. 43.16.3.9 and Cod. 8.4.1 gives the mistaken idea that
Huguccio took his gloss from Roman law.
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permitted to repel force without punishment.” 27 He then turned his
attention to the key term “moderamen inculpatae tutelae”: 28
Adhering to the norm of “moderamen inculpatae tutelae,” means that if
you are attacked with arms you may resist with arms. If you would be
attacked by persons without arms, you cannot repel your attacker with
arms without punishment. But can I not strike back with a lance, knife
or sword a person who has struck with a staff, club, or stone? Does the
definition of arms include stones and clubs? Is it not permitted to strike
back with a larger or longer lance, knife or stone when one is struck
with a smaller one? To this last question, I believe it is permitted. To
the first question I think that it is permitted to strike with a staff, club or
stone no matter what their size, and it is not permitted to strike back
with a lance, knife, sword or other metal. This will be judged
according to the decision of a judge and good men.

Huguccio made a clear distinction between the weapons of war and
weapons, if they could be called weapons, of a more common type.
Weapons of war, he concluded, can never be used against stones
and clubs, but the decision in the end belonged to the courts.
These conclusions may be true according to law but are repugnant
to the norms of the New Testament and its morality. To
demonstrate this conflict, he cited Romans 12:19 and 21:
Vengeance is mine, said the Lord of the Old Testament; disarm
evil with kindness. How can these biblical injunctions be

27

Ibid. p. 41: “Ad tuitionem sui quod est non odio vel ardore vindicte, set ut se
tueatur, nam quod ad tutelam sui corporis quis facit, iure facere extimatur, ut ff.
de iustitia et iure l. Vt vim[Dig. 1.1.3], set intelligendum si aliter evadere non
potest. Nam si aliter evadere potest, non licet ei vi repellere impune.”
28
Ibid. p.42: “Servato moderamine inculpate tutele, scilicet, ut si armis facta est
armis liceat repellere. Nam si sine armis esset facta non liceret eam impune
repellere armis. Set numquid percutientem virga vel baculo vel fuste vel lapide
possum repellere armis, scilicet lancea vel cutello vel gladio? Nonne nomine
armorum etiam lapides et fustes continentur? Numquid non licet repercutere
maiori et longiori lancea vel cutello vel lapide percutientem minori? Hoc ultima
casu credo quod liceat. In primo credo quod pro quantitate et qualitate virge vel
baculi vel fustes vel lapidis liceat vel non liceat repercutere lancea vel cultello
vel gladio vel alio ferro. Et hoc diiudicabitur arbitratu iudicis vel boni viri.”
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reconciled with the law of self-defense? 29 As the Ordinary Gloss
to the Bible declared, who did not leave vengeance to the Lord,
will sin mortally. 30
Huguccio asked ‘how can we reconcile Isidore’s assertion
that self-defense is a principle established by Ius naturale with
these biblical commands? How can a principle of ius naturale lead
to sin? It cannot be,” he must have thundered and jolted even his
most drowsy students back to life. 31 Some jurists had explained
these conflicting texts two ways: if the norms were not observed,
such as if a person waited to defend himself, or if it were not selfdefense but in the defense of another, or if “moderamen inculpatae
tutelae” was not observed. Secondly, the biblical commands were
for the “perfect;” for those who were not perfect the passages in
Romans was a counsel not a command. 32 Huguccio’s answer to
the conundrum he created reeked of a man who had spent too
much time in the classroom: the defense must be carried out with
the authority of a judge. Otherwise a person should suffer death
29

Ibid. p.42-43: “Hec verisimiliter dici videntur, set veritati repugnant, Nonne
dicit Apostolus precipiendo non defendentes vos carissimi, set date locum ire? .
. . Date locum ire, idest est vindicte Dei . . . Item preceptum Domini est ‘Mihi
vindictam, Subauditur reservate et ego retribuam.”
30
Ibid. p.43: “Super quem locum dicit expositor, ‘qui hoc non facit Deum
contempnit, id est qui non servat vindictam Deo set ipse eam accipit, Deum, id
est preceptum Dei contempnit’; ergo peccat mortaliter.”
31
Ibid. “Qualiter ergo est de iure naturali repulsio violentie per vim? Numquid
peccatum est de iure naturali? Absit.”
32
Ibid. p. 43-44: “Quidam volentes hec omnia ad consonantiam predictorum
reducere dicunt quod quis non debet repercutere et se defendere repercutiendo
ex intervallo, et non ad tuitionem sui, et non servato moderamine inculpate
tutele; in quo casu intelliguntur que dicta sunt de apostoli et Domini preceptis.
Alii dicunt quia non repercutere est preceptum perfectis, set imperfectis
consilium est; et ita si aliter agunt non peccant.” Přerovský cites Rufinus and
Johannes Faventinus in his apparatus as the proponents of Huguccio’s first
opinion. A glance at their works shows they do not hold that opinion. On
Johannes Faventinus see Andrea Bettetini, “’Giovanni da Faenza (Johannes
Faventinus),” Dizionario dei giuristi italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo
Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone, Marco Nicola Miletti (2 vols.;
Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.1013-1014, who unfortunately refers to Huguccio as
“da Pisa.”
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rather than consent to the evil of injuring another person. 33 To
explain the permissible force with which one could defend oneself,
Huguccio explained that one should understand that “force (vi)”
not as a weapon but as an obstacle, such as an arm. 34 Huguccio’s
argument makes good sense if it is understood as applying only to
the clergy who were forbidden to shed blood. But it is not clear at
all that he has limited his analysis to them. 35
Turning from personal self-defense to more general issues
of defense in twelfth-century society, Huguccio found
“moderamen inculpatae tutelae” a useful concept with which to
understand a vassal’s obligation to defend his lord with counsel
and assistance. Somewhat surprising, Gratian had included a letter
of Fulbert of Chartres (†1028) in his Decretum in which Fulbert
described the obligations of a vassal. Not surprisingly, Fulbert’s
letter was later incorporated into the Libri feudorum. 36 Huguccio
used the Diocletian’s and Maximilian’s phrase to limit a vassal’s
obligations to support his lord’s carrying out violence against
others. He took another step in expanding the scope of the phrase
in the Ius commune. His first point was that the vassal was only
obligated to give aid when the lord needed help in licit and honest
affairs. Moreover, if his lord was injured a vassal should respond
immediately, but within reasonable limits (moderamen inculpatae
33

Ibid. p.44: “Mihi videtur quod mortaliter peccet qui repercutit ferientem se
iuste vel iniuste, sive statim sive post, sive pro se sive pro alio, nisi faceret hoc
autoritate iudicis. Si vero aliter evadere non potest nisi repercutiat, potius debet
mortem incurrere et quelibet mala tolerare quam malo consentire, ut xxxii. q.v.
Ita [C.32 q.5 c.3].”
34
Ibid. 44-45: “Melius ergo sic intelligitur quod hic dicitur et in lege, licet
repellere vim adversarii, vi idest obstaculo . . .scilicet brachiorum vel alterius
rei.”
35
See the flawed analysis on this passage in Frederick H. Russell, Error! Main
Document Only.The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge Studies in
Medieval Life and Thought, Third Series, 8. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1975) 96.
36
See my essay . “Feudal Oath of Fidelity and Homage, “ Law as Profession
and Practice in Medieval Europe: Essays in Honor of James A. Brundage,
edited by Kenneth Pennington and Melodie Harris Eichbauer (Ashgate 2011)
93-115.
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tutelae) and with attention to the admonition of Saint Paul in
Romans 12:19: an enemy should be treated with respect; the vassal
should disarm malice with kindness. 37 Huguccio’s combining of
Roman and Biblical precepts to establish a legal norm was typical
of twelfth-century jurists. 38
Huguccio then turned from the question of intention and
judgment when exercising the right of self-defense to the question
of the moral duty and legal responsibility of defending someone
else. This step in his thinking was far from predictable. However,
as he thought about a person’s right to self-defense, the age and
society in which he lived presented another issue: a vassal’s duty
to protect his lord from harm. Vassals took an oath to do so.
“Nobody should sin himself or sin for another,” he reflected, “but
at the same time everyone has an obligation to defend anyone from
injury.” 39 Huguccio’s creation of a duty to render assistance to
others was an innovation in the Ius commune and was quickly
adopted by later jurists. Common law and civil law systems
divide on this point. Although the duty to assist is contrary to the
norms of British and American common law where the doctrine of
nonfeasance has held sway to the present day, thanks to Huguccio
and his successors, it is part of the marrow of civil law
jurisprudence. 40 Under the influence of the Ius commune and
37

Huguccio to C.22 q.5 c.18 Munich, Staatsbibliothek 10247, fol. 226v,
Admont, Stiftsbibliothek 7, fol. 316r, Lons-leSaunier, Archives departementales
du Jura 16, fol. 304v), s.v. auxilium et consilium: “In licitis et honestis. Puta pro
defensione sui et suarum rerum, licite tamen iniuriam enim illatam domino licet
uassallo incontinenti repellere cum moderatione tamen inculpate tutele, et non
contra preceptum Apostoli scilicet quo dicitur “Non defendentes,” etc. (Romans
12:19).”
38
Richard H. Helmholz, The Spirit of Classical Canon Law, The Spirit of the
Laws (Athens-London, 1996), pp. 149–151, pp. 164–165, pp. 314–315, pp. 344–
347.
39
Huguccio to C.22 q.5 c.18 (MSS cit.), s.v. consilium et auxilium: “Non enim
pro se uel pro alio debet quis peccare, set eodem modo tenetur iniuriam repellere
a quolibet.”
40
The doctrine of a duty to aid another person never emerged in common law,
and there is no general obligation or duty to assist another person. Recently there
have been attempts to enact “Good Samaritan” laws that imposes a duty on a
person to summon help for someone in danger, but these laws have not had great
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especially under the influence of the jurisprudential doctrine in
feudal law governing the oath of fidelity, most civil law legal
systems have a duty-to-assist other persons. 41
As one could infer from the quotation cited in the previous
paragraph, Huguccio did not think that a person’s a duty to assist
another person was limited to those who had sworn the oath of
fidelity in Christian society. He asked himself what is the legal
foundation behind the vassal’s duty to help his lord and his duty to
assist others? How would a vassal’s duty to his lord be extended
to a duty to aid others in distress? 42 He found the answers to those
questions not in Roman law but in a conciliar canon: “I say that the
vassal is bound to his lord <by the oath of fidelity> more willingly
and more specially—just as in the conciliar canon from the
Council of Toledo in Gratian’s Decretum. That canon stated that
the breaking of promises is to be feared.” 43 Huguccio quoted a
phrase from the canon and expected that his readers would supply
the complete quotation: “<the breaking of> specific promises is
support. One exception is that a person can contractually have a duty to assist.
Doctors, lifeguards, and babysitters have fallen into this category. See Melody J.
Stewert, “How Making the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An
Observation of Expanding Criminal Omission Liability”, American Journal of
Criminal Law, 25 (1998): pp. 385–435, Natalie Perrin-Smith, “My Brother’s
Keeper? The Criminalization of Nonfeasance: A Constitutional Analysis of
Duty to Report Statutes”, California Western Law Review, 36 (1999): pp. 135–
155 and Marcia M. Ziegler, “Nonfeasance and the Duty to Assist: The American
Seinfeld Syndrome”, Dickinson Law Review, 104 (2000): pp. 525–560. For an
argument that there should be a duty-to-assist and for some historical
precedents, see Steven J. Heyman, “Foundations of the Duty to Rescue”,
Vanderbilt Law Review, 47 (1994): pp. 673–755.
41
F.J.M. Feldbrugge, “Good and Bad Samaritans: A Comparative Survey of
Criminal Law Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue”, American Journal of
Comparative Law, 14 (1966): pp. 630–657, on pp. 630–631 states that
“however, Roman law and scholastic thought were unfavorably inclined toward
legislation of this nature ... since World War II ... almost every new criminal
code contains a failure-to-rescue provision.” He seems unaware of the deep
historical roots of the idea in the ethical and moral world of the Ius commune.
42
Huguccio to C.22 q.5 c.18 (MSS cit.), s.v. consilium et auxilium: “Quid ergo
prodest iuramentum uassalli domino?”
43
Ibid.: “Dico (quod add. L) propensius et specialius ei tenetur et ‘Solet plus
timeri etc.’ (D.23 c.6).”
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more to be feared than <the breaking of> of general vows.” 44
Huguccio argued that a vassal has a special obligation to his lord
but also a general duty to every other human being.
Later canonists followed the logic of Huguccio’s argument
and insisted that a vassal must do more than defend his lord when
he is in danger. Alanus Anglicus (ca. 1200) formulated a lapidarian
expression of the precept: “Although the oath of fidelity does not
expressly state it, a vassal should give heed that his lord may not
be injured.” 45 Tancred (ca. 1215) and following him, Bernardus
Parmensis in the Ordinary Gloss (ca. 1245), insisted that persons
who swore oaths of fidelity and obedience must protect their lords
from attack and harm. They were also bound to protect them from
plots and dangerous plans. 46 This principle remained an important
part of the jurisprudence that informed the oath of fidelity.
Huguccio then turned to a vassal’s military obligation to
aid his lord. He formulated several hypotheticals. What if the lord
wishes to seize his vassal’s fief or property? The vassal must not
obey his lord unless his lord’s war were just. A vassal was not
bound to obey if his lord moved against him personally. 47 What,
however, if the lord moved against his son or his father?
44

Gratian, D.23 c.6: “Solet enim plus timeri quod singulariter pollicetur quam
quod generali sponsione concluditur.”
45
Alanus Anglicus to C.22 q.5 c.18, Seo de Urgel 113 (2009), fol. 131r–131v:
s.v. consilium et auxilium: “Operam enim dare debet ne domino noceatur, licet
hoc in fidelitate non exprimatur, arg. ff. locati, In lege (Dig. 19.2.29 [27]), ff. de
uerborum oblig. In illa stipulatione (Dig. 45.1.50).”
46
Tancred to 1 Comp. 1.4.20(17)(X 2.24.4) (Ego [Petrus] episcopus), Admont,
Stiftsbibliothek 22, fol. 3v, Alba Iulia, Bibl. Batthyaneum II.5, fol. 3v: s.v. Non
ero neque in consilio neque in facto ut uitam perdat aut membrum: “Hoc non
sufficit, immo ‘opportet eum ubicumque senserit dominum periclitantem ad
prohibendas insidias, occurrere,’ C. quibus ut indignis l.ult. (Cod. 6.35.12) xxii.
q.v. De forma, ubi suppletur quod hic de fidelitate minus dicitur e econtrario.”
The quotation that Tancred took from Justinian’s Code is from a statute of
Justinian in 532 AD in which the emperor clarified a the meaning for Pope John
II of “sub eodem tecto” in the Senatusconsultum Silanianum that punished
slaves for not defending their masters.
47
Huguccio to C.22 q.5 c.18 (MSS cit.), s.v. consilium et auxilium: “Quid si
uelit inuadere illum uel res eius? In hoc casu non ei tenetur obedire nisi iustum
esset bellum. Item non tenetur ei contra se.”
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Huguccio’s answer relied on juridical distinctions made for the
treatment of family, kin, and vassals of excommunicates. 48 The
vassal did not have to obey his lord when his son and father lived
under the same roof. Otherwise, if his lord were waging a just war
against his family, the vassal was held to obey his lord. 49 These
questions and many others about what constituted a just defense
would be central to jurisprudential discussions of what constituted
a just war for centuries. 50
“Moderamen inculpatae tutelae” officially moved into
canonical jurisprudence in 1210 when Pope Innocent III’s curia
handed down a decision in a case in which a German priest named
Laurentius had struck a robber who was plundering the church
with a gardening tool. 51 Villagers who were aroused by the clamor
finished him off with clubs and swords. The papal judges
considered whether local witnesses could determine whether
Laurentius had delivered the fatal blow, what his intention was
when he struck the robber, and if he might have encouraged the
villagers to attack. The court should also determine the force of
Laurentius’s blow and where on the blow landed on the robber’s
body. Medical experts had testified that Laurentius’ blow was not
normally fatal. Furthermore, if the robber had struck Laurentius
first, the priest was justified in striking back. The judges quoted
the Roman law jurisprudence of self-defense and its limits that was
already firmly embedded in canonical jurisprudence: 52 The judges
48

See Elizabeth Vodola, Excommunication in the Middle Ages (Berkeley-Los
Angeles-London, 1986), pp. 63–64, 101–105, for a discussion of the canon that
Huguccio cited.
49
Huguccio to C.22 q.5 c.18 (MSS cit.), s.v. consilium et auxilium: “Set
numquid contra filium uel patrem tenetur ei obedire? Non si in una domo simul
morantur, arg. xi. q.iii. Quoniam multos (c.103). Alias si iustum esset bellum
contra filium uel patrem forte tenetur ei obedire.”
50
See Russell, Just War 95-126, which cannot be trusted in details.
51
Innocent III, Registers Patrologia latina 216.64-66, Letter 12.59, included in
canon law at 4 Comp. 5.6.2 (X 5.12.18).
52
Ibid. 66: “Vim vi repellere omnes leges et omnia iura permittant, quia tamen
id debet fieri cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae, non ad sumendam vindictam,
sed ad iniuriam propulsandam.” Thomas Aquinas used this decretal to support
his arguments about self-defense at Summa theologica 2.2 q.64 art.7: “Et ideo si

18

decided that it would be fitting if Laurentius did not exercise his
priestly office but could not resist quoting a popular proverb: “who
injures first, injures by touching, who injures second, injures with
criminal intent.” 53 This decretal replaced Gratian’s excerpt from
Isidore of Seville as the standard place to discuss self-defense in
canon law. 54
The civilians remained engaged in the discussion of selfdefense. Azo was the leading teacher of Roman law in the early
thirteenth century. 55 In his Summa on the Codex he delved deeply
into the character of “moderamen inculpatae tutelae.” As a first
step he defined when and how weapons could be used for a
defense of property and the meaning of the word “tutela:”
“Tutela,” he wrote was a synonym for “defense.” 56 A blameless
defense was either when a person defended himself from an
unarmed person without arms or when his arms matched those of

aliquis ad defendendum propriam vitam utatur maiori violentia quam oporteat,
erit illicitum. Si vero moderate violentiam repellat, erit licita defensio, nam
secundum iura, vim vi repellere licet cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae. Nec
est necessarium ad salutem ut homo actum moderatae tutelae praetermittat ad
evitandum occisionem alterius, quia plus tenetur homo vitae suae providere
quam vitae alienae. Sed quia occidere hominem non licet nisi publica auctoritate
propter bonum commune, ut ex supradictis patet; illicitum est quod homo
intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat, nisi ei qui habet publicam
auctoritatem, qui, intendens hominem occidere ad sui defensionem, refert hoc ad
publicum bonum, ut patet in milite pugnante contra hostes, et in ministro iudicis
pugnante contra latrones.” Thomas also cites the phrase “moderamen inculpate
tutelae” at Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 60 a. 6 ad 2.
53
Ibid. “qui ferit primo, ferit tangendo, qui ferit secundo, ferit dolendo.”
54
E.g. Bernardus Parmensis, Ordinary Gloss X 5.12.18 s.v. tutelae. The
primary reason why Isidore’s text was replaced was because Gratian was rarely
glossed after the middle of the thirteenth century.
55
Error! Main Document Only.Lange, Römisches Recht im Mittelalter, 1.255271 and Emmanuele Conte and Luca Loschiavo, “Azzone,” Dizionario dei
giuristi italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello
Mattone, Marco Nicola Miletti (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.137-139.
56
Azo, Summa codicis (Venice 1489) 8.4 (unfoliated): “Sed quem quis vult
iniuste expellere potest resistere vim inferenti et propulsare vim illatam ad
defendendam possessionem cum moderamine tantum inculpate tutele, idest
defensionis.”
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his attacker. 57 What if, however, a weaker person was attacked by
a stronger? That tipped the balance of justice: 58
What if the blow of one is stronger than the other? Can the
weaker use arms? Some say with too much simplicity that
the person attacked ought to suffer the first blow. But he
would have never struck back. It is sufficient that the
attacker will seek to enter with arms or to terrorize him
with arms that the owner may use arms against him. . . . A
blameless defense is maintained if the person repels the
attack in self-defense and not for vengeance.
Azo used a famous text from Roman law in the Digest’s title on
delicts (torts) to nuance and limit the right of defense of property.
If a tavern owner ran after a thief who had stolen his lantern, he
must not injure him intentionally more than was necessary to
retrieve his property. The Latin phrase “data opera possessor
oculum effodit” in the case became the common metaphor for
committing an act for which one’s intentionality determined one’s
responsibility. 59
57

Ibid. “quod inculpata sit defensio vel cum moderatione facta attenditur circa
duo: Si enim vi inferat sine armis propulsare vim debeo sine armis. Si autem
vim inferat cum armis possum eundem armis repellere, ut ff. eodem l.iii. § Cum
igitur [Dig. 43.16.3.9]. Arma autem sint omnia tela, hoc est fustes et lapides,
non solum gladii baste framee (Swords, large staves, that is, spears), ut ff.
eodem l.iii. § Armis [Dig. 43.16(15).3.2] , idest gladii utrinque incidentes, etiam
solet dici misericordia framea (a weapond that was used in executions).”
58
Ibid. “Quid si pugnus illius durior sit quam ipse percussoris alterius, forte
propter debilitatem nature debilibus utetur armis? Illud quidam dixerunt
simplicitate nimia servandum ut possessor debeat pati primo se percuti quam
ipse percutiat. Sed certe forte numquam percuteret postea. Satis est ergo quod
alius petit possessorem invadere armis vel armis terreat ipsum. Ut sic possessor
contra eum utatur armis, ut ff. eodem l.iii.§ Qui armati et ad leg. Aquil. L. Sed et
si quemcumque et ad leg. Cor. de sic. l. Si qui. Item moderamen adhibetur in
alio ut quis propulset ad sui defensionem non ad vindictam, ut ff. ad leg. Aquil.
l. Scientiam § Qui cum aliter.”
59
Ibid. “Sed numquid videtur semper fieri ad defensionem si fiat incontintenti?
Et ait Ja. quod sic. Ego puto ita presumendum esse. Sed tamen posset probari
contrarium, scilicet quod data opera possessor oculum effodit vim inferenti non
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Within the boundaries of this paper it is not possible to
explore all the nooks and crannies of juristic thought on the
jurisprudence of a legitimate and just defense. From this point on
I present an outline of what could be a very good monograph. That
is not to say that the first part of the paper is comprehensive, but
the following remarks are even much less so.
With those caveats in mind, I fast forward to the early
fourteenth century and to the great jurist and poet, Cinus de
Pistoia. 60 Cinus wrote a long analysis of the legimate defense to
the text in Justinian’s Codex which provoked much discussion
under the title Unde vi, which contained Diocletian’s and
Maximian’s principle of “Moderamen inculpatae tutelae.” 61 After
a word by word analysis of the statute, Cinus turned to the issue of
when property could be defended justly. 62 After observing that
Diocletian’s and Maximinian’s statute was both useful and subtle,
he cited Jacobus de Ravannis’ opinion that anyone who possessed
property clandestinely did not have a valid right to it. The
legitimate owner could rightfully take the property back. 63 Dinus
de Mugello, wrote Cinus, objected. 64 Force was not permissible
ad sui defensionem, ut ff. ad leg. Aquil. l. Si ex plagiis § Tabernarius [Cod.
9.2.52(53).1].”
60
Paola Maffei, “Cino, Sinibuldi da Pistoia,” Dizionario dei giuristi italiani
(XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone, Marco
Nicola Miletti (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.543-546 and Hermann
Error! Main Document Only.Lange, and Maximiliane Kriechbaum, Römisches
Recht im Mittelalter, 2: Die Kommentatoren (München: C.H. Beck’sche
Verlagsbuchhandlung, 2007) 632-658.
61
Cod. 8.4.
62
Cinus de Pistoia, Lectura super Codice (Venice: 1493) to Cod. 8.4, fol.
335vb-336rb.
63
Ibid. “Adverte quia iste passus est utilis et subtilis. Videtur enim hic Ja<cobus
de Ravannis> predictus sentire quod possidentem clandestinum licet mihi
expellere si a me clam possidet quia clandestina possessio est viciosa, ut ff. de
acqui. pos. l. Pompo. § Cum quis, ergo cum viciosam habeat possessionem mihi
licet ingredi et sibi non licet retinere, et pro hoc adducit, supra quod cum eo l. Si
servus et glossa videtur sentire istud, ff. uti pos. l.i. [Dig. 43.17(16).1].”
64
Andrea Padovani, “Dino Rossoni del Mugello,” Dizionario dei giuristi
italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone,
Marco Nicola Miletti (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.769-771.
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because Dinus knew of no law that sanctioned it in that situation.
Implicitly Cinus and his teacher Dinus thought that the courts, not
arms, were the proper forum for the dispossessed to vindicate their
rights. 65
What defines a legitimate defense? Cinus focused on two
points: an equivalency of force and arms and of time. Violence
that exceeded those limits was no longer legitimate. 66 His first
example marked Cinus as a professor. What if, he asked, a big,
strong man entered my room with a raised fist; if I could not avoid
his onslaught, can I protect my book that he wanted to take with
arms? Cinus concluded that the human body was more important
than property. He could not defend his book with weapons. 67
65

Cinus de Pistoia, Lectura ibidem: “Respondent quidam quod ex quod nolo etc.
quod non approbat Dynus ibidem quia non reperitur lege aliqua cautum quod
clandestinum possessorem liceat mihi per vim expellere. Praeterea lex dicit vim
vi repellere licet, sed qui clam intrat non infert vim, ergo etc. secundum eum,
quod verius credo.”
66
Ibid: “Circa lex istam queritur hic dicitur quod pro defendenda possessione
mea vim illatam propulsare, licet cum moderamine inculpate tutele que sunt illa
que requiruntur ad huiusmodi moderamen? Respondent doctores sint illa que
equipollent violentie illate in qualitate armorum. Item que equivalent in cursu
temporis. Item que equivalent in ipso actu violento ne alias excedendo
censeatur vindicta.”
67
Ibid: “Circa primum dubitatur quid si quidam robustus homo et fortis contra
me pugno elevato veniret cui si eodem modo resisteret non possem evadere,
nonne mihi licebit cum armis tueri? Certe videtur quod sic quia equalitas
ubicumque debet attendi, arg. supra de fruct. et lit. expen. l. ultima [[Cod.7.51.6]
et ff. de arbit. l. Si cum dies [Dig. 4.8.21(26)]. Econtra videtur quod non, quia si
aliquis sine armis veniret ad cameram meam librum meum per vim ablaturus
ego velut impar virium corporis percutio eum cum ense impune iam fieret
compensatio rei ad corpus humanum quod esse non debet, ut de sacrosanct.
eccles. l. Sancimus in fine [Cod. 1.2.21-22]. Solutio in hoc articulo Pe<tri> sic
dicit aut tractatur de violentia repellenda circa corpus aut tractatur de violentia
repellenda circa res. Primo casu licet propulsare iniuriam cum armis et
quandocumque si aliter non possum defensio parari quia non potest alias et per
remedium iudicis talis iniuria reparari, ut supra de appell. l. Siquis [Cod.
7.62.30] et quia si possum interficere furem ubi non cognosco eum et sic ubi non
possum habere remedium pro rebus meis multomagis etc. ut ff. ad leg. Cor. de
sic. l. Furem [Dig. 48.8.9]. Secundo casu quando queritur de propulsatione
iniurie circa res, tunc refert aut iniuria vel violentia que infertur mihi circa res
posset reparari per viam iudicii aut non. Si posset per viam iudicii reparari tunc
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Cinus then broached the question of the meaning
“incontinenti” or immediately. If the aggressor has inflicted injury
and the resistance is not immediate, the injured person should go to
court. Two influential jurists from Orléans, Jacrobus de Ravannis
and Petrus de Belleperche, were agreed that a distinction must be
made between violence to persons or things. 68 Injuries to persons
must be repelled immediately, but injuries to property not,
depending on the circumstances. Why is there this difference?
asked Cinus, because injuries to persons cannot be recovered but
damages to property can be. Further, recovering property even
after a period of time can be considered a defense of a person’s
rights. 69 Cinus also pointed out that even if a person repelled force

non licet mihi propulsare iniuriam quocumque modo, sed cum moderamine in
qualitate armorum non factorum.”
68
On these two jurist see Hermann Error! Main Document Only.Lange, and
Maximiliane Kriechbaum, Römisches Recht im Mittelalter, 2: Die
Kommentatoren (München: C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 2007) 518567.
69
Ibid. “Sed circa hoc dubitatur quomodo intelligatur “incontinenti.” Dicunt
quidam ipsa aggressione fragranti [i.e. flagranti], si tamen impleta esset iniuria
ex parte sua tunc non potest <facere> sed ad iudicem est recurrendum. Sic
intelligitur hoc cum similibus. Alii dicunt etiam post fragrantiam [i.e.
flagrantiam] aggressionis ex intervallo dumtamen non divertat ad extraneos
actus, arg. ff. de adul. l. Quod ait in fine. Solutio. Distinguendum est secundum
Ja. de Ra. et Pe. aut queritur de violentia illata persone aut de illata rebus. Si
persone tunc incontinenti appellatur ipsa fragrantia, ut ff. ad leg. Aquil. l.
Scientiam § Qui cum aliter [Dig. 9.2.45.4], et sic intellige ff. de iustit et iur. l.
Vt vim. Si queritur de violentia illata rebus tunc incontinenti accipitur nedum in
ipsa fragrantia aggressionis sed postea, dum tamen non divertatur ad extraneos
actus, ut ff. eodem l. Qui possessionem et l.iii. § Cum igitur [Dig. 43.16.3.9], et
sic intellige quod hic (ibi 1493 ed.) notavi. Accipitur ergo incontinenti modo
uno quando infertur ius persone et alio quando rebus. Cur tamen varie?
Respondeo quia cum illata est iam iniuria persone non potest auferri, ut supra de
apellat. l. Si quis provocatione [Cod. 7.62.30], et sic quicquid ammodo fieret
intelligeretur fieri ad vindictam. Sed quando rebus tunc potest auferri et ideo si
statim fiat non videtur vindicta sed tuitio sui iuris, et ita intelligitur statim etiam
si vadit querendo amicos, ut notavi in dicto § Cum igitur [Dig. 43.16.3.9].”
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immediately, he could still be held to have acted with fault if he
could have avoided the confrontation. 70
The jurist very early on connected a legitimate defense of
personal property and self-defense to their theories of what
constituted a just war. 71 Johannes de Legnano was the first jurist
to incorporate the detailed commentaries of the jurists into his
treatise on the laws of war. Johannes was particularly dependent
on Cinus’ commentary on the right of an individual to defend
himself: 72
The sixth question is whether it is licit to defend property as one
would defend one’s person whom one can resist in self-defense?
Solution: One may do so, among persons who have the right to
hold property; thus I exclude slaves, monks, and the like <who
would not have the right to defend property they do not own>.
But I admit that a legitimate defense ought to take into
consideration the various qualities of persons. For one should act
differently and more gently against a father than against an
absolute stranger; and so with each relationship which comes up

70

Ibid. “Tertium moderamen est equivalentia actui volento, ut scilicet fiat ad
defensionem illius actus et non ultra. Sed dubitatur quomodo scietur [sciemus
ed. 1493] utrum faciat ad defensionem? Jac. de Are.[de Are. om. 1476 ed.]
antiquus doctor dicit quod presumitur fieri ad defensionem si fiat incontinenti, si
ex intervallo presumitur ad vindictam, et hoc quidam moderni approbant, sed
male quia incontinenti potest fieri ad ultionem ut si aliter evadere potest, ut dicto
§ Cum aliter [Dig. 9.2.45.4].”
71
Russell, Just War 161, dismisses the importance of ‘moderamen inculpatae
tutelae” for their thought and does not understand the precision of the term in
jurisprudential thought.
72
Johannes de Lignano, De bello, trans. and edited Thomas Erskine Holland
(The Classics of International Law; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1917)
150: “Sexto qureritur, an pro rebus licitum sit contra omnes vim vi repellere
contra quos licitum est pro personis? Solutio. Quod sic, in personis iure valent
habere bona, ut excludam servos, monachos, et similes. Fateor tamen quod
moderamen tutelae diversificari debet, attenta varia personarum qualitate. Nam
aliter, et mitius, contra patrem quam contra penitus extraneum, et sic de singulis
qure consideranda venirent, inspectis singulis circumstantiis, cum non sint haec
iure limitata, ut l.i. ad finem, ff. de iure deliber. et cap. De causis, de offic. iud.
delegati.”
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for consideration, all the circumstances are to be weighed, since
these rights are not circumscribed
A new issue had arisen in the fourteenth century: the culpability of
self-defense against an insane person, a minor person, or a person
who has to react to a situation without understanding the context.
A text that was attributed to Pope Clement V at the Council of
Vienne but was not among the conciliar canons stated: 73 “If an
insane person, young child, or sleeping person should mutilate or
kill a man, he incurs no irregularity from this. We decree the same
for one who, unable to avoid death, kills or mutilates an invader.”
Johannes applied this new norm to the concept of “moderamen
inculpatae tutelae.” Johannes thought that killing an insane person
was the only exception to the norm of limiting the use of force in
self-defense. It also exonerated the perpetrator of all culpability.74
At the end of his treatise, he linked “moderamen inculpatae
tutelae” to the norms of waging war. 75
By the end of the
fourteenth century, the jurists had developed a complicated and
detailed analysis of “moderamen inculpatae tutelae.” I have found
no one who doubted that a person’s natural right to defend himself
was limited, except in the case of a madman. 76
73

Clem. 5.4.1: “Si furiosus, aut infans seu dormiens hominem mutilet vel
occidat: nullam ex hoc irregularitatem
incurrit. Et idem de illo censemus, qui mortem non valens, suum occidit vel
mutilat invasorem.” This text and its possible source is discussed by Brandon
Parlopiano, Madmen and Lawyers: The Development and Practice of the
Jurisprudence of Insanity in the Middle Ages (Ph.D Dissertation, The Catholic
University of America 2013) 217-219.
74
Johannes de Legnano, De bello 149: “numquid vim vi repellendo circa res
suas, si contingat vim repellentem occidere, vel mutilare, vim inferentem, evitet
poenam irregularitatis? Et pono ubi hoc faciat cum moderamine inculpatae
tutelae, quid alias non praecederet quaestio. Et videtur quod evitet. Nam pro
defensa persona, evitat poenam illam, ut in Clem. Si furiosus, de homicidio.”
75
Ibid. 151-152: “Qualiter liceat hoc particulare bellum indicere? . . . Et huic
respondet textus quod licet cum moderamine inculpatae tutelae.”
76
For a jurist see Walter Ullmann, Error! Main Document Only.The Medieval
Idea of Law as Represented by Lucas de Penna: A Study in Fourteenth-Century
Legal Scholarship, Introduction by Harold Dexter Hazeltine (London-New
York: Barnes & Noble-Methuen, 1969, reprint of 1946 edition) 154-155 and for
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Skipping forward almost three centuries, the discussions of
the norm became most sophisticated in the writings of the jurists
who wrote tracts of criminal procedure in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. Of those writers, the most important
criminal lawyer of the medieval and early modern period was
Prospero Farinacci (1544-1618). He was probably educated in
Perugia and quickly gained experience on both sides of the bench.
In 1567 he became the general commissioner in the service of the
Orsini of Bracciano; the next year he took up residence in Rome as
a member of the papal camera. However, in 1570 he was
imprisoned for an unknown crime. Legal problems hounded him
for the rest of his life. He lost an eye in a fight, was stripped of his
positions, and was even accused of sodomy. 77 In spite of his
difficulties, Pope Clement VIII reinstated him to the papal court in
1596. Farinacci defended Beatrice Cenci who was accused of
killing her father in the most famous criminal case of the time. 78
He began his most important work, Praxis et theorica criminalis,
in 1581 and put the finishing touches on it by 1601. 79 In his great
a theologian, Brian Tierney, Error! Main Document Only.The Idea of Natural
Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150-1625
(Emory University Studies in Law and Religion. Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars
Press, 1997) 236-237 (Jacques Almain).
77
When Giuseppe Cesari painted Farinacci s portrait ca. 1600 (Rome, Museo
Nazionale di Castel Sant Angelo) he quite deliberately and obviously posed him
to leave his left eye in the shadows.
78
See my essay ATorture and Fear: Enemies of Justice,@ Rivista internazionale
di diritto comune 19 (2008) 203-242 at 235-236 and “Women on the Rack:
Torture and Gender in the Ius commune, “ Recto ordine procedit magister:
Liber amicorum E.C. Coppens, edited by Jan Hallebeek . Louis Berkvens, Jan
Hallenbeek, Georges Martyn, and Paul Nève (Iuris Scripta Historica 28;
Brussels: Royal Flemish Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1212) 243-257;
Beatrice Cenci: La storia, il mito. ed. Mario Bevilacqua and Elisabetta Mori
(Roma 1999).
79
Most recently Aldo Mazzacane, “Farinacci, Prospero,” Dizionario dei giuristi
italiani (XII-XX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone,
Marco Nicola Miletti (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.822-825. Also Aldo
Mazzacane, ‘Farinacci, Prospero (1544-1618)’, Juristen: Ein biographisches
Lexikon von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert, ed. Michael Stolleis (München
1995) 199-200; Niccolò Del Re, ‘Prospero Farinacci giureconsulto romano
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tract on criminal procedure Farinacci devoted 16 folio pages to a
discussion exclusively devoted to the norm, which also appears in
many other parts of his work. He was critical and perhaps a little
exasperated by his predecessors’ complicated discussions: 80
One would want that “moderamen inculpatae tutelae” required equality
of blows and so the persons who returned blows would give them in
equal measure. This is to say that this is, in a certain way, to argue as
Jewish scholars do . . . a legitimate defense must be conducted in due
proportion, not as to the effect but as to the weapons used. . . . I think
a more true opinion, which is especially supported by the common
opinion of the doctors, is that one cannot have a scale or a measuring
device with which to measure the blows struck.

The decision whether a self-defense was legitimate, argued
Farinacci following, he says, the great jurist Baldus degli Ubaldis,
must be left in the hands of a judge. There are too many variables
in any particular case to have certain rules. 81 Farinacci particularly
did not like to detailed analysis of “incontinenti,” or what sort of a
(1544-1618)’, Archivio della Società Romana di Storia Patria, 3rd series 28
(1975) 135-220. Mazzacane writes that he completed it in 1614, but an edition
of Praxis et theoricae criminalis was published in Venice: apud Georgium
Variscum, 1603 (in fine 1601), which is described as the third edition, with
additions made by the author to the first and second editions, see Antichi testi
giuridici (secoli XV-XVIII) dell’Istituto di Storia del Diritto Italiano, ed.
Giuliana Sapori (Università degli Studi di Milano, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto di
Storia del Diritto Italiano, 7; Milan 1977) 1.242, no. 1162.
80
Prospero Farinacci, Praxis et theoricae criminalis (2nd ed. Nürnburg: 1676), 4
quaestio 125, part 6, p.324-340 at 327-328: “In eo quod vult in moderamine
inculpatae tutelae requiri aequalitatem percussionum et sic quod repercussio
debeat fieri ad mensuram percussionis et quod sic dicere, sit quodam modo
judaizare . . . quo in moderamine inculpatae tutelae requiritur defensionis ad
offensam debita proportio, non ex parte effectuum sed ex parte instrumentorum
et armorum . . . quasi voulerit dicere moderamen fuisse servatum, etiam quod
ex defensione resultet major offensio insultantis . . . pro hac contraria opinione
quae apud me verior est maxime facit alia communis doctorum conclusio quod
non potest stateram in manibus habere insultatus quando se defendendo
insultantem percutit nec minus potest ictus dare ad mensuram.”
81
Ibid. 336: “Et generaliter ut iudicis arbitrio remittatur an et quando sit
servatum moderamen inculpatae tutelae, qualisque et quantus sit excessus
secundum Baldum . . . ubi reddit rationem, quia scilicet de factis hominum non
potest dari propter nimian factorum multiplicitatem, certa regula.”
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time period after the initial attack could still be considered an act
of self-defense. “<These speculations on the period of time
permitted to defend oneself> open the way for men to take revenge
on their own authority and to kill their enemies. They avoid the
death penalty by claiming ‘I was provoked, I was injured, I was
offended’.” 82 To prove his point to cited a case from Naples in
which a man was not punished capitally because he pleaded that
the man he killed had thrown stones at his window every night for
a year. The court was sympathetic and did not condemn him to
death but sent him to the galleys. 83
In another undated Neapolitan case from the first half of the
fifteenth century, the issue of what today we could call police
brutality had to be decided. The court turned to the distinguished
jurist Tommaso Grammatico († 1556) for a decision. 84 Three
henchmen of a “magnificent” Neapolitan captain were pursuing a
man suspected of crimes but who had escaped. They could not
capture him by other means, so they were forced to wound him.
As he lay on the ground one of the men stabbed him again. The
court was hesitant what the correct decision in this case should be.
In his pro et contra argumentation Grammatico first pointed out
that representatives of the court (the captain and his men) cannot
be faulted for not following the norm “Moderamen inculpatae
tutelae.” They were not bound by the norm when pursuing a
criminal if the criminal resisted arrest. 85 Grammatico cited similar
cases from Perugia and Pisa. Other jurists, particularly the
82

Ibid. 337-338: “Esset enim aperire viam hominibus ulciscendi se propria
auctoritate inimicosque suos occidenti, ac postea ad evadendum mortem quam
alteri intulerunt, dicere “fui provocatus, fui iniuriatum, fuique offensus.”
83
Ibid. 337: “testatur ita fuisse servatum in illo Neapolitano apud eum Consilio
ut scilicet sic occidens non poena ordinaria puniatur sed ad triremes
condemnetur.”
84
Ennio Cortese, “Grammatico, Tommaso,” Dizionario dei giuristi italiani (XIIXX secolo), edd. Italo Birocchi, Ennio Cortese, Antonello Mattone, Marco
Nicola Miletti (2 vols.; Bologna: Mulino, 2013) 1.1045-1047.
85
Tommaso Grammatico, Decisiones sacri regii consilii neapolitani (Lyon:
Apud haeredes Iacobi Iuntae, 1555) Decisio 41, 175: “Quod etiam si talis
prosecutio processisset absque moderamine inculpatae tutelae, non tenetur
familia curiae propter resisentiam, quam ille faciebat.”
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Neapolitan criminal lawyer, Paridis de Puteo, agreed.
Grammatico, however, was not swayed by the arguments in favor
of their overenthusiastic actions. He concluded that two of the
men who wounded him in flight were absolved of wrong-doing,
but the man who stabbed him while prostrate on the ground must
serve fifteen continuous years in the galleys. 86
In the next centuries, the principle of “moderamen
inculpatae tutelae” came under attack. John Locke († 1704)
thought that the right of self-defense was not limited. He made his
most trenchant statement in his An Essay Concerning the True
Extent and End of Civil Government first published in 1690. 87
This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief who has not in the least
hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther than by the
use of force, so to get him in his power as to take away his money, or
what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he has no right
to get me into his power, let his pretense be what it will, I have no
reason to suppose that he who would take away my liberty would not,
when he had me in his power, take away everything else. And,
therefore, it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himself
into a state of war with me -- i.e., kill him if I can; for to that hazard
does he justly expose himself whoever introduces a state of war, and is
aggressor in it.

Like Locke, John Milton († 1674) seems to recognize no limits on
a person’s rights when a she exercised her right of self-defense: 88
Although reason dictates a difference between a robber and an enemy,
with an enemy the rights and laws of war must be observed; the robber
has no rights from the law of war and no rights from the law of peace
(i.e. those bestowed by the legal system) that would be recognized.
86

Ibid. 176: “Maxime quia erant tres birruarii qui ipsum subsequebantur cum
dici non possit non fuisse penitus in dolo, fuit per magnam Curiam condemnatus
ad remigandum in regiis triremibus per quinquequennium continuum, caeteri
vero duo absoluti.”
87
(Boston: Edes and Gill, 1773) 11.
88
John Milton, De doctrina christiana (Cambridge: Typis Academicis, 1825)
432: “Quamquam latronis atque hostis ratio dissimilis est: cum hoc jus belli
saltem servandum; cum illo neque belli neque pacis jus uIlum est quod
servetur.”
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Although this seems to be the only place where Milton touched
upon the right of self-defense, it has become a touchstone for those
who wish to discard the principle of “moderamen inculpatae
tutelae.” 89 Immanuel Kant († 1804) was also an early skeptic: 90
The jurists believe that a person in a state of nature must control
himself to conform to that which is proper for a defense, that is
moderamen inculpatae tutelae. That means simply that without
necessity I should not use the most extreme violence when a lesser
degree of force can be employed. That is correct according to laws of
ethics. According to strict right and justice, I can never be limited when
someone threatens to kill me. According to natural law, I am not bound
to use lesser force, and, therefore, moderamen inculpatae tutelae does
not apply. But in civil society the principle is valid since the state can
require that I have a duty to not injure other persons. If, however, my
life is possibly but not certainly in danger the state cannot promulgate a
law that requires that I exercise a limited defense since (1) the most
severe punishments the state can render are not greater than the evil
that I face. The law, therefore, cannot restrict my defense. Such a law
would be absurd.
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David I. Caplan and Sue Wimmershoff-Caplan, “Postmodernism and the
Model Penal Code v. the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments — and the
Castle Privacy Doctrine in the Twenty-First Century,” University of Missouri
Kansas City Law Review 73 (2006) 1073-1164 at 1161.
90
Kant’s gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1979) vol. 27.2,
p.1374: “Die Juristen glauben, der Mensch müsse im statu naturali sich soweit
mäßigen, als es eben zur Defension reicht: d.i. Moderamen inculpatae tutelae.
Das bedeutet bloß, daß ich nicht ohne Noth die äußerste Violenz brauchen soll,
wenn ein geringer Grad nöthig ist. Nach ethischen Gesetzen ist das richtig.
Nachm jure stricto kann ich dadurch nie verbunden werden, wenn einer mir den
Tod droht, ihm das anzuthun. Im jure naturae bin ich nicht verbunden, ein
gelinderes Mittel zu brauchen, daher gilt hier moderamen inculpatae tutelae
nicht. Aber im statu civili findts statt, denn der Staat kann von mir einen
Erhaltungsbürgen fordern. Wenn aber mein Leben selbst wol möglich, aber
ungewiß ist, so kann der Staat gar nicht das Gesetz geben, mich denn zu
moderiren, denn (1) die größten Strafen, die der Staat geben kann, sind nicht
größer als die Uebel, die ich gegenwärtig habe. Das Gesetz kann mich daher
davon nicht abhalten. Ein solch Gesetz wäre absurd.” Cf. B. Sharon Byrd,
“Kant’s Thoery of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution in its
Execution,” Law and Philosophy 8 (1989) 151-200 at 187-188.
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Kant was not a jurist. Perhaps it is unfair to criticize this
hodgepodge of ideas that he put together about self-defense. To
list his wobbles: No jurist ever thought that Ius naturale limited a
person from exercising his right to defend himself. As we have
seen “moderamen inculpatae tutelae” was a principle of Roman
law that was attributed to the Ius gentium, i.e. positive law, not to
the Ius naturale. The jurists did not connect “moderamen
inculpatae tutelae” to Ius naturale or to the state of nature over the
centuries. They also never argued this principle was based on
ethical standards. Although he may not have been the first, that
seems to have been Kant’s central idea. To argue that the state and
its jurisprudence cannot restrict a person’s ability to defend himself
may be true on the basis of higher principles or norms, but Kant’s
conviction ignored European jurisprudence. Kant’s argument does
have this in its favor: if Saint Isidore of Seville was right that selfdefense is a natural right, a ius naturale, how can a norm that
evolved out of positive law, “moderamen inculpatae tutelae,”
trump that absolute right? 91 Intentionality and proportionality are
products of the human mind. They evolved from an ethos and in a
jurisprudence that accepted another fundamental principle, the
bonum commune, that limited rights by weighing them against a
person’s duty to recognize another person’s right to remain alive,
even when she were behaving badly.
Locke, Milton, and Kant did not drive “moderamen
inculpatae tutelae” out of the early-modern courtroom. Mary
Lindemann has given us a detailed account of the role the principle
still played in a colorful criminal trial in eighteenth-century
Hamburg. 92 On 18 October 1775 Anna Maria Romellini, a
beautiful courtesan who adorned the Hamburg social scene was
staying in a home owned by her lover Antonio de Sanpelayo, a
Spanish consul to the independent city of Hamburg.
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See Mordechai Kremnitzer and Klalid Ghamayim, “Proportionality and the
Aggressor’s Culpabiblity in Self-Defense,” Tulsa Law Review 39 (2004) 875899 at 895-896, who discuss Kant and Hegel on self-defense.
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Mary Lindemann, Laisons dangereuses: Sex, Law and Diplomacy in the Age
of Frederick the Great (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) in a
splendid piece of micro-history devotes her book to the trial.
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Unexpectedly, an Italian adventurer, Joseph Visconti, arrived at
Romellini’s door and demanded that she and some of Santelayo’s
silver leave with him. He seems to have had a claim on her. She
had lived with him and had consented to join him in a clandestine
marriage. 93 However, whatever attachment she had once had to
him no longer existed, and she refused to abandon Sanpelayo. A
Prussian nobleman, Joseph baron von Kesslitz, and Sanpelayo
came to her aid. Kesslitz had a sword, Sanpelayo a cane, and
Visconti a knife. A brawl broke out. When it was over, Visconti
was dead with 23 wounds; the coroners decided that two of them
were certainty fatal. 94 Kesslitz was imprisoned, and his lawyer,
Detenhof, argued self-defense. It was a tough sell, but Detenhof
was well-acquainted with the jurisprudence of self-defense that we
have reviewed in this essay. He cited our norm “Moderamen
inculpatae tutelae” in his brief. 95 He also referred implicitly to
Pope Clement V’s decretal when he described Visconti as a “mad
dog.” As we have seen Clement’s decretal exonerated any use of
force against madmen. 96 The Prussian Allgemeine Landrecht
decreed that a person could wage a defense “through a means
appropriate to the situation.” 97 Other legal voices were heard.
Johann Klefeker, a prominent jurist in Hamburg, had insisted in his
treatise on criminal law that those who were attacked had a duty to
retreat. Detenhof argued that in spite of the unequal weapons and
numbers, Visconti’s skill with a knife compensated for the power
of Kesslitz’ sword. 98 After reviewing the evidence, the Hamburg
Senate decided that the evidence was strong enough that Kesslitz
should stand trial for murder. The indictment for murder described
Kesslitz’ wounds as being slight in comparison to Visconti’s
twenty-three. 99 “Moderamen inculpatae tutelae” may have been
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under siege in philosophical circles but not in the Ius commune or
in the Hamburg’s courts.
Today, most legal systems, if not all, have the principle of
“moderamen inculpatae tutelae” in their jurisprudence of selfdefense, if not explicitly, then implicitly. The term is still present
in every American and foreign law dictionary.
However,
especially in the United States, the principle is being questioned by
those who want no limitations placed on the ownership of guns and
on the right to use them. Locke, Kant, Milton, and others are being
called upon to support the idea that person’s right to defend herself
or her property cannot be curtailed. 100 The authors of the
American Model Penal Code, Herbert Wechsler, Louis Schwartz,
and Sanford Kadish are pilloried for their liberal agendas because
they limited a person’s right to self-defense. 101 Intentionality and
proportionality, however, may not be a part of the legal, moral, and
ethical universes of state legislators who have largely rejected
these principles, but these old Roman law principles will probably
survive this latest assault on their validity.
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See the essay by Caplan and Wimmershoff-Caplan, “Postmodernism and the
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